

EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE, AND INCOME OF ASIAN AMERICANS

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This article examines data from the 1980 census on the education, occupations, and personal income of various groups of Asian Americans in light of general hypotheses derived from assimilation, human capital, and structural theories. The results show that most Asian Americans are better educated than are whites, blacks, and Hispanics. But after other variables are introduced, only Japanese Americans approach income equity with whites. The Chinese, Filipinos, Koreans, and Asian Indians have variable income losses, partly because of the large number of recent immigrants. Although the occupational prestige scores of Asian American men seem to be commensurate with their high levels of education, their incomes do not. Generally, the findings seem to support structural theories, in that the higher educational levels of Asian immigrants—and even of those who were born here—do not necessarily lead to income equity with whites.

Asian Americans have been labeled "model minorities" because it is presumed that they have attained "success" through education and high-income occupations. Although there is no question about the high educational levels of most categories of Asians in the United States, it is not clear whether Asian Americans have been able to translate their education into equivalent occupational prestige or income levels. Most careful research indicates that they have not, but some confusion exists in the literature, either because only a few ethnicities have been studied (usually Chinese and Japanese) or because insufficient attention has been paid to the differences that are due to the immigration

histories of various groups. In addition, previous studies did not really investigate the reasons why higher levels of education may not be paying off for Asian Americans. The study presented here attempted to rectify these problems by examining as many ethnic groups as possible, by paying close attention to immigration variables, and by examining the relationships of education, occupation, and income.

THEORIES OF ADAPTATION

Assimilation

The general role of education in the occupational achievement of immigrant minorities has long attracted sociologists. Assimilation theories (Gordon 1964, 1968; Park 1950) mostly assumed that education would help immigrants to become acculturated and subsequently to assimilate to some degree. Examples or research dominated by this viewpoint abound (Hurr and Kim 1984; Kitano 1976; Kuo 1977; Montero 1981; Montero and Tsukashima 1977; Peterson, 1971; Wang 1981; Yu 1977). Although all these studies focused on some variant of assimilation theory, it is noteworthy that most of them questioned some or all the outcomes one would expect of assimilation theory. Hurr and Kim, for example, found Koreans to be relatively unassimilated and were led to the

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concept of "adhesive adaptation," which is similar to "enclave." On the other hand, most of the assimilation studies found strong relationships between education and income or occupation, especially in the case of Japanese Americans.

Human Capital

Human capital theory even more directly asserts the positive role of education in the advancement of minorities. It asserts that success in school and high levels of formal education increase the prospects for better paying, higher status, and more satisfying employment (Berg 1969; Parsons 1968). This approach has dominated American educational policy toward minorities. Its advocates cite the high levels of both the educational achievement and economic success of Jews and Asian Americans in support of the theory (Peterson 1971; Sklare 1971; Sung 1967). Portes and Stepick (1986) stated that many of the positive aspects of human capital can be found in ethnic enclaves, a position disputed by Nee and Sanders (1987).

Structural Critiques

More recently, with structural theories dominating the literature, the role of education in the successful adaptation of migrants to American society has been questioned. Both Lieberman (1980) and Steinberg (1981) supported structural arguments by showing that the social and economic entry of a generation into American society preceded the high levels of formal education of its children. Bonacich and Cheng (1984) made a similar point with regard to Asian minorities, demonstrating that their immigration to the United States was tied to peripheral economic exploitation. The high levels of education of the children of these early immigrants came after their parents' initial adjustments. Earlier generations of sociologists had assumed that education would eventually minimize the inequities confronting American minorities, but today, more often than not, we confront the question of continuing inequities, in terms of both educational achievement and the relationship between education and occupational and economic achievement (Bowles and Gintis 1976; Collins 1971; Mayes 1977; Ogbu 1978; Scimecca 1980).

Many of the structural criticisms of assim-

ilation and human capital theories rest on studies of long-time resident minorities in the United States, especially blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians. Asian Americans have been considered different from these ethnic groups because of their comparatively high levels of education and high visibility as petite bourgeoisie and professionals. This view has led to explanations popularized by the terms "model minorities" (Kitano 1976) or "middlemen" (Bonacich 1973). In general, these theories assert that Asian Americans have benefited from selective immigration, relatively favorable entry conditions, and favorable "niches" in the host economy (Lieberman 1980). There can be little question that most Asian Americans are well educated (Hirschman and Wong 1986) and that they tend not to experience extreme residential segregation (Langberg and Farley 1985; Massey and Denton 1987), although some enclaves exist, notably among the Chinese in New York and San Francisco (for an analysis of San Francisco, see Nee and Sanders 1987). However, there is an abundant literature that suggests that the higher levels of education of Asian Americans are not always translated into other measures of success.

Studies of Asian-Americans' Success

Suzuki (1977), Woo (1985), and E. Wong (1985) all attacked the "myth" of the success of Asian Americans. The report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1978) demonstrated vividly that minorities and women were not receiving income returns on educational investment equivalent to those of white men. The commission reported that Chinese, Filipinos, and Japanese had higher educational levels than did other minorities, but that . . . "the greater educational attainment of the Asian American populations does not result in increased financial rewards compared to majority males, as would be expected if everything else were equal" (p. 26).

M. Wong (1980, 1982), Hirschman and Wong (1981, 1984, 1986) and Wong and Hirschman (1983) extended these concerns to Asian Americans. Their studies all showed that specifically Asian Americans are at a disadvantage in turning education into income, as are new immigrants and women; the only possible exception is Japanese, whom they suggested had "made it" as of 1975. Chiswick (1983), however, concluded that

American-born Chinese and Japanese earned about the same income per year of education as did whites; Filipinos still experienced some economic deprivation. In the case of Hawaii, Fujii and Mak (1983) showed that as of 1975, all minorities were disadvantaged compared to whites, although they stated that all immigrants (except whites) were more disadvantaged than were the native born.

In summary, research seems to indicate that although some Asian Americans are better educated and better paid than are many other American minorities, there still may be a slippage between their relatively high educational levels and their equivalent occupations or incomes. The literature suggests that compared to whites most Asian Americans seem to be overeducated for the occupations they hold. In addition, all the foregoing research suggests that we should tend carefully to the following:

1. There is an enormous variation among the different Asian-American ethnic groups. Thus, these groups must be examined separately.
2. Each Asian-American group is composed of both those who were born here (natives) and immigrants. The effects of nativity and period of immigration must be dealt with separately.
3. Gender differences may be as great or greater than interethnic differences.
4. The "success" of Asian Americans is often cited only in reference to professional occupations or business. The whole range of occupational categories needs to be examined.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

Several hypotheses are suggested by the previous discussion:

The assimilation hypothesis: The longer an immigrant group lives in the United States, the closer the income parity with whites, controlling for other variables known to affect income.

The human capital hypothesis: The higher the educational levels of any ethnic group, the greater the income parity with whites, controlling for other variables known to affect income.

The structural hypothesis: Differences exist between minorities and dominant members of the society in the relationship between length of residence and income and between educa-

tion and income. Structural barriers prevent minorities from converting their length of residence or education into income parity with whites.

Many of the assertions of assimilation theory are untestable with census data. However, in general, there is a strong presumption that immigrants will come to resemble natives the longer they remain in the host society. It would also follow that Asian-American natives should appear more similar to whites than to immigrants and that each succeeding generation should be more assimilated. This presumption is complicated, however, by the history of older Asian American cohorts. As Bonacich and Cheng (1984) pointed out, earlier immigrants, for the most part, were brought to the United States as cheap labor for the peripheral economy. Most were not well educated and faced fierce discrimination. The most recent immigrants were generally well educated before they entered the United States, and many were already integrated into the urban core economic sector (Gardner, Robey, and Smith 1985). Nevertheless, Moon (1986), citing Lieberman (1980) suggested that older cohorts of immigrants (Chinese and Japanese) should show more resemblance to whites than should the newer groups (Koreans, Vietnamese, and Asian Indians). This suggestion holds only for the native-born members because Chinese and Japanese as a whole would be affected by more recent immigrants.

It is apparent that many Asian Americans have high levels of education, although educational levels may vary according to ethnic group. Human capital theory holds that high levels of education should result in higher incomes. The structuralist critiques of assimilation and human capital theories suggest that education need not translate to higher levels of either occupation or income. Their arguments are generally based on the experiences of blacks and American Indian minorities, who also exhibit low educational levels overall. Asian Americans should provide an excellent test for these critiques because they are well educated, but nevertheless appear to gain fewer returns from education than do whites. Assuming that the recency of immigration does not explain this discrepancy completely, we should turn our attention to other explanations. The Wisconsin studies of achievement (Sewell, Haller, and Portes 1969; Sewell and Hauser 1975)

suggest that the interrelationships of education, occupational prestige, and income may provide a key. We may ask if discrepancies in the education and income of Asian Americans are due to slippages between education and occupational prestige or between prestige and income. This is an important point for human capital advocates and critics alike: Is the problem one of not obtaining jobs commensurate with education or one of receiving lower salaries for the same jobs? The latter would be a case of exploitation or discrimination.

In pursuing these questions, we must examine other well-known determinants of income, such as age, work experience, occupational sector, time at work, and gender (Chiswick 1983; Hirschman and Wong 1981, 1984). Throughout, it is essential that each ethnic category of Asian Americans be examined separately, to avoid the common obfuscation caused by lumping all persons of Asian descent into one category (See, for example, Tienda and Lii 1987).

The 1980 census is extremely valuable to these ends. It allow us to incorporate data on the large number of immigrants from Asia who have entered the United States since the revisions of the immigration laws in the late 1960s and, to examine for the first time, sizable samples of Koreans, Asian Indians, and Vietnamese.

THE SAMPLE AND DATA ANALYSIS

The Asian-American data used here are from a tape prepared by the Pacific/Asian American Mental Health Research Center from the 1980 Census 5% Public Use Sample (PUMS A). All households containing at least one Asian American were drawn from the PUMS A tape. This procedure eliminated households not containing Asian Americans, so we drew smaller samples of whites, blacks, and Hispanics from a composite of the PUMS A and B .1% tapes. The present research is based on a file that restricts the sample of ages 25-64, a convention enabling us to examine persons who presumably completed their formal education.¹ The term

¹ This convention produces some obvious biases, as can be seen in average ages and in incomes and occupations. However, the purpose of this article is to examine the consequences of education, and this purpose is best served by limiting the sample to those who have completed their

*rac*es refer to the census definition of race, except *Hispanic*, which includes all races. However, we drew samples in such a way that there are no overlaps between Hispanics and Asian Americans. Throughout, we employed the census definitions of *rac*es, though we prefer the term, *ethnicity*. It should be noted that the present samples represent population numbers (5 percent of the population) for Asian Americans only. Whites, blacks, and Hispanics were included for comparison purposes only; their samples, while random, are not proportional to the population on any consistent basis.²

The working files contained sample sizes ranging from approximately 20,000 (Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos) to about 5,000 (Vietnamese, whites, blacks, and Hispanics). The exact numbers are presented in Table 1.

RESULTS

Levels of Education

Table 1 shows the educational levels of Asian Americans, compared to whites, blacks, and Hispanics. As previous research indicated, all Asian-American groups, except Vietnamese, are better educated than are whites. Hispanics, blacks, and Vietnamese exhibit the lowest levels of education. Note that Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, and Asian Indians all are better educated than are Japanese, but Japanese are somewhat better

education and to those who have jobs and incomes. For a precedent, see Blau and Duncan (1967).

² We decided to examine each race separately because of the size of these files. A composite file would have permitted us to enter race as a variable, but the cost of running it would have been prohibitive. Besides, research reported by Blau and Schwartz (1984) and Hirschman and Wong (1981, 1984) suggested that "race" as such would produce little in the way of direct effects. Readers may note some variation in the figures reported here compared to other sources. This difference is ordinarily due to different methods of recoding or specifying missing data and poses no problem for analytical purposes as long as the methods are consistent. However, "real" figures are best taken from official reports of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Whether census figures are accurate representations is another question. One may question some data for good reasons. The language-ability items are particularly suspect, and certainly income reports may be biased downward.

Table 1. Years of Education, by Race, 1980 (percentage)

Years of Education	Japanese	Chinese	Korean	Filipino	Asian		Black	Hispanic	White
					Indian	Vietnamese			
None (no formal education)	0.5	4.7	2.2	0.8	1.4	4.7	0.9	3.7	0.5
1-6 (primary school)	1.2	8.4	5.4	6.9	3.1	11.6	8.9	21.9	3.5
7-11 (some middle school and some high school)	10.8	11.4	12.0	11.7	10.5	19.5	32.7	28.2	20.7
12 (high school degree)	37.0	19.6	29.1	19.1	13.4	29.7	33.2	25.1	39.9
13-15 (some college)	21.7	15.7	16.3	20.6	14.0	21.5	15.5	13.2	17.3
16 (college degree)	15.6	15.8	21.2	21.7	14.1	6.1	4.9	3.5	9.4
17-19 (some graduate school or more)	10.5	17.2	9.4	14.1	23.1	4.9	3.4	3.2	6.5
20 or more (doctorate or equivalent)	2.6	7.1	4.4	5.1	20.5	2.0	0.5	1.2	2.1
Total number	21,129	21,725	8,833	19,689	10,477	4,916	4,151	4,186	4,887

educated than are whites. Asian Indians, in particular, stand out, since a high percentage (43.6 percentage) of them have had graduate education. This high percentage is due to the selective immigration primarily of physicians and engineers.

A relatively high number of Chinese, Korean, Filipino, and Vietnamese individuals have had only a primary school education or less. These data reflect the state of education in Asia, since all these groups are predominantly immigrants who completed all or most of their education before coming to the United States (Barringer, Smith, and Gardner 1985,

pp. 22-25). To put these data in perspective, note that as of 1980, only about 27 percent of Japanese were immigrants, but 75 percent of Chinese, 83 percent of Filipinos, 92.2 percent of Asian Indians, 93.7 percent of Koreans, and 98.2 percent of Vietnamese in the United States had immigrated to this country.

Occupation and Education

As Kan and Liu (1986) demonstrated, most Asian Americans are better educated for professional and executive occupations than are whites. Table 2 verifies this finding and

Table 2. Mean Years of Education, by Occupation, Sex, Occupational Sector, and Race*

Variable	Japanese	Chinese	Korean	Filipino	Asian		Black	Hispanic	White
					Indian	Vietnamese			
Total Population	13.28	13.06	13.15	13.56	15.28	11.11	9.75	11.01	12.32
<i>Occupation</i>									
Executive, administrative, managerial	14.71	14.76	15.19	15.41	16.33	13.86	13.28	13.22	14.10
Professional specialty	16.48	17.49	16.92	17.02	18.20	15.59	14.98	15.23	16.06
Technical and related support	15.02	16.40	16.00	15.56	16.83	14.30	13.36	12.92	13.55
Sales	13.28	13.16	13.77	13.82	14.33	11.18	11.51	12.10	12.84
Administrative support	13.40	14.02	13.93	14.52	14.54	12.88	12.14	12.48	12.57
Service—Private household	10.98	8.37	7.42	9.53	9.47	6.69	7.26	9.46	10.39
Service—protective	13.75	13.07	12.84	13.25	13.73	12.42	11.70	12.40	12.74
Service—other	12.00	9.92	11.24	11.78	12.07	10.48	8.92	10.40	11.02
Farming, forestry, fishing	12.02	10.29	11.39	8.76	8.71	9.20	5.96	8.08	10.66
Precision production, craft	12.21	11.45	12.57	12.47	13.51	11.02	9.53	10.85	11.42
Operator assembler, inspector	11.57	7.90	11.50	11.71	11.96	10.64	8.33	10.59	10.71
Transportation, equipment, material movers	11.88	11.90	13.02	11.15	12.91	10.45	9.29	10.59	10.88
Handlers, helpers, cleaners	11.73	10.67	11.67	10.37	11.91	9.84	8.36	9.94	10.30
<i>Sex</i>									
Male	13.93	13.86	14.87	13.60	16.58	12.15	9.99	10.89	12.61
Female	12.85	12.23	12.00	13.53	13.60	10.14	9.51	11.11	12.03
<i>Occupational Sector</i>									
Periphery	13.29	12.27	13.37	13.85	15.04	11.51	9.68	11.29	12.53
Core	13.75	14.94	13.76	14.22	16.52	12.17	10.62	11.55	12.54

* Occupation and occupational sector for those with wages or salaries only.

extends the analysis to other occupational categories. Although the results vary somewhat, depending on which category we scrutinize, it appears generally true that Asian Americans (again except Vietnamese) are "overeducated" compared to whites for a wide variety of occupational categories. In this regard, Japanese most nearly approximate whites, but in lower prestige jobs, their educational levels are also one to two years higher than those of whites. Fluctuations in this table, plus important differences in the proportions holding specific occupations within each of these broad categories (not shown), suggest that an intensive study of actual occupations is badly needed. (Barringer, Cho, and Xenos forthcoming; and Xenos, Barringer, and Levin 1989).

Gender

Table 2 also displays the mean educational levels of men and women. As might be expected, men are generally better educated than are women (with the exception of blacks and Filipinos, for which the differences are minimal). The greatest differences appear for Chinese, Koreans, Asian Indians, and Vietnamese, which again reflects the large proportion of immigrants in these populations. The uniformity for Filipinos reinforces our earlier warnings about generalizations. Differences in education by gender are not great for whites—a fact that will take on special significance when we examine income.

Occupational Sector

Not unexpectedly, "core" employees are generally better educated than are those in the "periphery."³ The differences are not great for most ethnicities, and there is no difference for whites. The differences appear the greatest for Chinese, Asian Indians, and Hispanics. As we shall see, incomes are generally

much higher in the core than in the periphery, so the lack of educational differences is significant, as in the case of gender.

Region of the United States

There is some regional variation in educational attainment. We have not shown it here because it is small and has little effect on occupational prestige or income. Whites show little variation, but other ethnicities are best educated in the East and worst educated in the South and West. One exception is Chinese in the East. This anomaly is associated with a low income level. A little investigation and questioning led us to New York City, which has a large enclave of Chinese. This community deserves an in-depth study. Since almost all Asian Americans reside in standard metropolitan statistical areas, we conclude that these differences are due to true regional variations that are perhaps explainable by concentrations of people in certain occupations.

Personal

Turning to Table 3, one can observe the benefits in personal income that are attributable to various levels of education. The mean total income for all groups is shown at the bottom of the table. Asian Indians enjoy the highest personal incomes, followed by Japanese and whites. It is notable that Vietnamese exhibit the lowest incomes—even lower than those of blacks and Hispanics. Of the people with a middle-school education or lower (no education through Grades 9), as well as of those with various levels of high school and of those with some college, whites and Japanese clearly enjoy the greatest income advantage. For college graduates, Japanese, whites, and Hispanics have the greatest marginal increases in income.

Various levels of graduate education show considerable fluctuation, which is not comprehensible without knowing something about the actual degrees acquired or the occupations filled. Of those with 20 or more years of education, it appears that Japanese lose some of the advantages they demonstrated in other categories. Filipinos and Hispanics appear to gain considerably in this bracket, and Asian Indians begin to lose their relative advantage to whites. Notable, Japanese gain much less than do whites at this high level of education,

³ Sector refers to the concepts of *core* and *periphery* that are similar to formal and informal sectors. The core is characterized by a sophisticated technology, is capital intensive, and generally denotes modern industry. The periphery is labor intensive, smaller scale, with a simpler technology; agriculture and service are examples. We used the scheme to reclassify subjects by industry of employment.

Table 3. Marginal Increase in Income for Additional Education Completed, by Race, 1979^a

Years of Education	Japanese	Chinese	Korean	Filipino	Asian Indian	Vietnamese	Hispanic	Black	White
Fewer than 12									
Total income	\$11,187	\$7,587	\$7,603	\$9,124	\$8,430	\$7,309	\$8,550	\$8,827	\$11,346
12 (high school)									
Total income	12,921	10,573	8,881	10,731	10,255	8,730	11,052	10,136	12,604
(marginal increase)	(1,734)	(2,985)	(1,278)	(1,607)	(1,824)	(1,421)	(2,502)	(1,309)	(1,258)
13-15									
Total income	14,036	12,408	11,401	11,865	11,046	9,454	12,346	11,690	14,095
(marginal increase)	(1,115)	(1,835)	(2,520)	(1,134)	(791)	(724)	(1,294)	(1,554)	(1,491)
16 (college)									
Total income	19,860	14,612	13,670	13,024	13,614	12,274	16,259	14,796	18,126
(marginal increase)	(5,824)	(2,204)	(2,269)	(1,159)	(2,568)	(2,820)	(3,913)	(3,106)	(4,031)
17-19									
Total income	18,144	16,841	20,005	16,179	17,951	14,203	15,387	15,919	20,183
(marginal increase)	(-1,716)	(2,229)	(6,335)	(3,155)	(4,338)	(1,929)	(-872)	(1,123)	(2,057)
20 or more									
(doctorate or equivalent)									
Total income	24,706	25,056	26,918	27,813	26,771	17,939	26,232	19,485	29,560
(marginal increase)	(6,562)	(8,215)	(6,913)	(11,634)	(8,819)	(3,736)	(10,845)	(3,566)	(9,377)
Mean total income	15,215	13,309	12,315	13,013	16,667	9,391	10,638	10,542	14,186

^a Mean personal income (wages and salaries only).

the explanation of which will require a close examination of particular occupations. Note that the actual incomes of individuals with 20 or more years of education are highest for whites, followed by Filipinos, Koreans, and Asian Indians. Throughout this table, Vietnamese continue to demonstrate the lowest returns from education of all the groups studied. It is also clear that whites have a considerable advantage over all Asian-American groups except Japanese, especially in terms of the marginal income these groups attain for various levels of education.

Year of Immigration/Nativity

Table 4 presents the means for years of schooling, age, occupational prestige, personal income, and number of weeks worked in 1979, by period of immigration and by nativity. Generally speaking, the newest immigrants are slightly less well educated than those who immigrated in the 1970-74 period. This trend could reflect a change in the later immigrants (more people who joined their families), or it could mean that the earlier immigrants received some education in the United States immediately after they immigrated. Japanese are an exception, probably because recent-immigrants (few in number) are mostly employees of large Japanese corporations located in the United States who can be expected to return to Japan

after a tour of duty; thus, they are of little interest here. There appears to be little consistent difference in education between natives and immigrants, but, for the most part, immigrants seem to be better educated than are natives. Figures for blacks and whites are not shown because virtually all are native born.

Age differences are minimized in this table because the sample is restricted to ages 25-64. Nevertheless, the lack of large age differences between adjacent periods of immigration is striking. As we would expect, immigrant groups who have been in the United States longer are older, but there seems to be only a year or two difference between those who entered from 1975 to 1980 and those who arrived between 1970 and 1974. This age table also gives us a reasonably good idea about the average length of employment if we assume that employees are reasonably settled in a job by age 25. Of course, immigrants might have changed specific jobs, but, overall, job experience should be highly correlated with age. Occupational prestige is considerably lower for immigrants who entered between 1975 and 1980 than for all those who entered later.⁴

⁴ Occupational prestige is a complex measure that is based on a national prestige study, educational level, and income. The measure used in this article was developed by Temme (1975) and

Table 4. Mean Characteristics of Asian Immigrants and Natives, by Period of Immigration/Nativity

Ethnicity	Period of Immigration	Years of Education	Age (in years)	Mean Occupational Prestige (Temme Score)	Personal Income (Wages and Salaries)	Weeks Worked in 1979	Number
<i>Chinese</i>							
Immigrants	1975-80	12.1	37.2	40.7	\$7,946	25.9	5,291
	1970-74	13.0	37.2	44.2	11,797	36.5	3,908
	1965-69	13.4	39.3	46.1	14,333	38.8	3,229
	1960-64	13.2	41.8	46.4	15,837	39.8	1,560
	1950-59	12.8	45.6	46.7	16,663	38.9	1,476
	Before 1950	11.2	53.2	43.8	16,205	38.1	1,239
Natives		14.4	39.4	48.7	15,971	39.9	5,022
<i>Filipino</i>							
Immigrants	1975-80	13.3	37.9	39.0	9,074	31.4	5,050
	1970-74	14.4	37.0	44.7	13,588	40.9	4,941
	1965-69	14.4	39.6	46.4	15,643	42.1	3,427
	1960-64	13.8	41.0	46.5	15,846	41.1	1,123
	1950-59	13.3	45.0	43.4	15,494	39.1	1,175
	Before 1950	10.2	53.3	35.0	13,363	33.9	609
Natives		12.4	37.4	39.4	12,756	38.3	3,364
<i>Korean</i>							
Immigrants	1975-80	12.1	36.5	37.2	9,027	27.1	3,805
	1970-74	13.2	37.7	41.4	12,609	34.2	2,840
	1965-69	14.2	38.9	47.9	16,975	33.0	949
	1960-64	13.8	41.6	46.5	16,822	34.9	461
	1950-59	15.3	42.7	50.7	20,128	37.9	278
	Before 1950	13.5	52.2	44.3	17,425	23.0	31
Natives		13.4	41.7	45.0	15,909	37.0	469
<i>Asian Indian</i>							
Immigrants	1975-80	14.6	34.3	48.9	11,414	29.9	3,710
	1970-74	15.8	35.2	54.0	17,522	37.4	3,434
	1965-69	16.9	38.6	57.6	23,753	40.7	1,538
	1960-64	17.0	41.3	58.9	26,791	43.6	466
	1950-59	16.6	46.3	55.9	25,101	41.3	233
	Before 1950	12.5	53.1	48.7	18,739	28.5	57
Natives		12.2	46.5	41.9	11,396	26.6	1,039
<i>Japanese</i>							
Immigrants	1975-80	14.5	34.0	48.4	19,236	24.7	2,152
	1970-74	13.2	36.7	40.1	13,330	28.5	1,128
	1965-69	12.9	40.8	39.4	12,593	28.7	858
	1960-64	12.3	44.3	37.3	11,370	28.1	937
	1950-59	12.5	46.6	36.9	10,897	30.2	1,859
	Before 1950	12.1	53.4	39.6	13,602	33.8	187
Natives		13.5	43.8	44.5	15,656	40.2	14,008

ter that period, prestige increases only gradually. Also, immigrants who entered in about 1965 or earlier appear to have higher prestige

than do natives. Again, Japanese appear to be an exception for the reasons suggested earlier.

Personal income follows about the same pattern as occupational prestige, with immigrants who entered from 1975 to 1980 having much lower incomes than those who entered from 1970 to 1974. Each succeeding group of immigrants has a higher income, and, again with Japanese an exception, natives earn considerably less than do later immigrants. Note that groups with a high proportion of immigrants in the 1975-80 period have depressed overall mean incomes.

Weeks worked in 1979 is highly correlated

Commission on Civil Rights. Because the U.S. Bureau of the Census changed occupational codes for 1980, we obtained a matching of the 1970 and 1980 codes from the bureau. Some guesswork was entailed, so we trust these scores only for comparative purposes. Since we completed this task, Stevens and Cho (1985) adapted the Featherman-Stevens scores. We tried both and found that the Temme scores gave stronger correlations with income, so we retained that measure. Blau and Duncan (1967) discuss prestige scores in detail.

with income, so it is not surprising that the pattern for this variable is about the same for immigrants as are the patterns for income, prestige, and education. The exception is that natives seem to work more weeks per year than do all immigrants.

On the face of it, these figures suggest that new immigrants (those immigrating from 1975 to 1980) have some initial adjustments to make, after their education, occupational prestige, and income improve with the time they spend in the United States. We wish to emphasize that variations in income appear much greater and are more consistent than are variations in prestige and education. If we assume that similar prestige scores indicate similar occupations, it would appear that immigrants' occupations vary little by the length of time the immigrants spend in the United States. Their incomes do vary considerably, which suggests that when they first arrive, immigrants are paid less for similar occupations. We will return to this subject in our multivariate analysis.

It is possible, of course, that these cross-sectional data simply show different cohorts with different characteristics. However, the trends are so consistent that it seems unlikely. Also, from 1960 to 1980, there were no lengthy periods of change in the gross national product, employment, or other measures of economic growth in the United States that could correspond in any way to the patterns shown in Table 4. We suggest, then, that this table gives some tentative support for the assimilationist argument that Asian immigrants should improve their positions the longer they remain in this country. We also find some tentative support for Moon's (1986) contentions about "earlycomers" and latecomers from the data on natives (see also, Lieberman, 1980). Chinese and Japanese natives have the highest incomes, with Koreans close behind. They are followed by Filipinos and Asian Indians, the newcomers.

Professionals and Executives

After examining data from the 1980 census, Kan and Liu (1986), found a relative increase in the educational levels of Asian Americans that was at least partially attributable to the high educational levels of recent immigrants. They concluded, however, that relatively high proportions of Asian Ameri-

cans in professional and managerial occupations are mismatched (overeducated), a finding noted earlier in the report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1978). It remains to be seen whether this mismatch results in proportionately lower incomes. We were curious about this phenomenon and decided to break down these categories in greater detail, especially with respect to class of worker.

Table 5 generally agrees with Kan and Liu, but it also reinforces what other data have shown, namely, that Japanese are better compensated for their education, while other Asian Americans generally are not. Again, Vietnamese are the least compensated. There is also a consistency across class of worker, except among self-employed professionals. Generally, self-employed workers are the best paid, followed by private-wage workers and governmental workers. It is surprising that Japanese are the best-paid self-employed executives and administrators because it has been thought that few Asian Americans were in these categories. But what is of greater interest, is that Asian American self-employed professionals (again, except Vietnamese) earn much more than do whites. It seems that Asian Americans have made their greatest gains in the professions, but Japanese are also doing well in executive and administrative occupations. The numerical representation of Asian Americans in all these occupational categories is generally even, although Filipinos are somewhat underrepresented in executive and administrative occupations. In summary, Japanese are doing well in high-prestige occupations, but other Asian Americans seem to be best off as self-employed professionals.

Multivariate Analysis

The analysis so far has suggested that Asian Americans do not receive income returns from education that are equal to those of whites (although Japanese come close). We pointed to the recency of immigration as a major contributor to the low income of immigrants and examined the effects of sex, occupational sector, occupation, age, and time worked, as well as education and income. At this point, it is necessary to introduce all these variables simultaneously,

Table 5. Mean Years of Education and Personal Income, by Class of Worker, (Executives and Professionals), by Race, 1979^a

Class of Worker	Japanese	Chinese	Korean	Filipino	Asian Indian	Vietnamese	Hispanic	Black	White
<i>Executives, administrators, and Managers (number)</i>	2,352	2,492	720	1,385	1,064	213	203	197	497
Private wage worker									
Mean years of education	14.9	15.3	15.4	15.5	16.7	14.1	13.3	13.2	14.1
Mean income	\$23,918	\$17,371	\$18,375	\$15,767	\$20,489	\$13,648	\$16,239	\$15,226	\$21,826
Government worker (all)									
Mean years of education	15.1	16.2	16.2	15.5	16.5	14.0	14.2	13.7	14.7
Mean income	\$19,698	\$18,492	\$15,530	\$16,059	\$16,728	\$14,407	\$17,789	\$14,855	\$18,801
Self-Employed (all)									
Mean years of education	13.4	13.0	14.8	14.6	15.0	13.2	11.6	10.9	13.5
Mean income	\$25,163	\$16,635	\$20,112	\$21,241	\$19,191	\$14,104 ^b	\$19,078 ^b	\$8,498 ^b	\$22,533
<i>Professional Speciality (number)</i>	3,055	4,034	1,102	3,259	3,295	368	234	286	529
Private wage worker									
Mean years of education	16.0	17.4	16.6	16.7	18.0	15.6	14.0	14.7	15.4
Mean income	\$18,195	\$20,741	\$19,120	\$18,371	\$22,698	\$14,687	\$14,659	\$13,163	\$17,378
Government worker (all)									
Mean years of education	16.7	17.5	17.2	17.0	18.3	15.6	15.7	15.6	16.4
Mean income	\$17,384	\$17,147	\$21,002	\$18,181	\$20,268	\$13,091	\$12,519	\$13,767	\$15,051
Self-employed (all)									
Mean years of education	17.3	17.9	17.5	18.8	19.0	15.7	16.7	13.7	17.4
Mean income	\$35,483	\$36,438	\$37,978	\$46,314	\$45,781	\$22,635 ^b	\$26,754	^b	\$30,018
Total sample (number)	21,129	21,725	8,833	19,689	10,477	4,916	4,106	4,151	4,887

^a Mean personal income (wages and salaries only).^b N < 20.

to observe how they combine to affect income. For this purpose, we employed multiple classification analysis (MCA), since many variables of interest are not continuous and education cannot be reduced to a dummy variable without losing information on returns in relation to credentials. Weeks worked in 1979 was introduced as a covariate because it is continuous and does not lend itself easily to categorization.

We should emphasize that the purpose of this analysis is not to maximize the predictions of mean income. Rather, we are interested in determining how well some of our predictor variables holdup in a multivariate model when all variables are considered together. Because sex, sector, immigration/nativity, prestige, time worked, and education have so far appeared to have effects on

income, we shall pay special attention to those variables.

Table 6 abstracts all the necessary information from the MCAs. Blacks and Hispanics are not shown because neither are particularly relevant at this stage of analysis. *F* ratios can be compared within each ethnicity, but not across ethnicities because of differences in the size of the samples. For comparisons among ethnic categories, we instead examine the adjusted beta coefficients. For example, education contributes more to variations in income among Chinese than among Japanese or Filipinos. The diminished adjusted effects of education on income are due to occupational prestige, which intervenes between education and income. We were concerned that part of this effect may be due to the artificial nature of the Temme prestige scores, so at one point we substituted oc-

Table 6. Multiple Classification Analysis of Determinants of Personal Income^a

Variable/Statistic	Japanese	Chinese	Filipino	Korean	Asian Indian	Vietnamese	Whites
<i>Weeks Worked, 1979 (covariate)</i>							
F ratio	3298.2	4853.8	3382.1	1599.3	2389.2	1527.3	1147.7
Grand mean income	\$15,230	\$13,307	\$13,180	\$12,336	\$16,689	\$9,416	\$14,166
<i>Sex</i>							
F ratio	2381.4	948.7	1096.8	308.1	240.6	170.3	615.9
Eta (unadjusted)	.45	.31	.26	.37	.35	.28	.47
Beta (adjusted)	.32	.19	.23	.21	.15	.19	.34
Deviation in dollars (adjusted)							
Male	\$3,686	\$1,866	\$2,529	\$2,591	\$1,533	\$1,161	\$3,421
Female	-3,638	-2,312	-2,028	-2,272	-2,815	-1,476	-4,376
<i>Industrial Sector</i>							
F ratio	312.7	449.4	164.7	72.3	75.4	95.0	93.9
Eta (unadjusted)	.23	.29	.14	.15	.18	.21	.25
Beta (adjusted)	.12	.14	.09	.09	.08	.14	.13
Deviation in dollars (adjusted)							
Periphery	\$-1,211	\$-1,214	\$-828	\$-832	\$-1,055	\$-983	\$-1,547
Core	1,412	1,892	940	1,384	1,126	895	1,427
<i>Year of Immigration/Nativity</i>							
F ratio	27.0	98.1	108.6	44.6	83.8	9.0	.03*
Eta (unadjusted)	.17	.29	.25	.28	.37	.13	.06*
Beta (adjusted)	.07	.13	.14	.15	.18	.08	.02*
Deviation in dollars (adjusted)							
1975-80	\$2,413	\$-2,289	\$-2,287	\$-1,819	\$-2,705	\$-132	\$-1,209
1970-74	1,046	-728	-162	300	170	129	-1,438
1960-69	-1	534	1,691	2,507	3,717	732	-546
Before 1960	-729	1,883	1,462	3,704	4,133	5,097	-183
Native	-242	1,048	381	1,846	-827	3,354	16
<i>Age</i>							
F ratio	328.0	156.7	53.9	17.0	42.3	66	45.7
Eta (unadjusted)	.15	.14	.19	.21	.25	.08	.15
Beta (adjusted)	.21	.14	.09	.08	.11	.06	.15
Deviation in dollars (adjusted)							
25-34	\$-3,263	\$-1,664	\$-970	\$-1,037	\$-1,610	\$-1	\$-2,293
35-44	1,550	1,637	779	672	1,588	405	632
45-54	2,096	1,449	1,011	1,207	1,201	-330	1,931
55-64	1,375	518	-191	-378	446	-1,744	1,317
<i>Education Completed</i>							
F ratio	127.0	140.7	74.0	14.3	45.9	19.1	62.0
Eta (unadjusted)	.28	.37	.27	.36	.37	.31	.28
Beta (adjusted)	.15	.16	.12	.08	.13	.12	.21
Deviation in dollars (adjusted)							
1-3 years high school or less	\$-1,945	\$-2,323	\$-1,349	\$-1,061	\$-2,491	\$-479	\$-2,487
Completed high school	-1,383	-1,304	\$-1,215	\$-713	\$-2,251	\$-238	\$-866
Some college	-508	-651	-882	-503	-2,207	-371	-146
College graduate or more	2,389	1,936	1,312	1,268	1,297	1,830	4,349
<i>Occupational Prestige</i>							
F ratio	450.6	465.8	694.7	178.9	242.7	66.3	54.0
Eta (unadjusted)	.39	.46	.39	.44	.44	.34	.30
Beta (adjusted)	.22	.24	.29	.24	.23	.18	.16
Deviation in dollars (adjusted)							
Low (0-33)	\$-3,080	\$-2,901	\$-2,796	\$-2,257	\$-4,232	\$-917	\$-1,901
Medium (34-51)	-716	-911	-1,218	-933	-2,978	-27	-340
High (51-88)	3,275	3,120	4,196	4,327	2,929	2,599	2,656
Multiple R	.651	.659	.603	.631	.646	.658	.668
Multiple R ²	.423	.435	.364	.399	.418	.433	.446
Number	15,225	16,005	15,113	5,616	7,654	3,101	3,437

^a Personal income (wages and salaries only).^b Statistically insignificant at the .01 level.

cupational categories themselves, with no discernible change.

Table 6 lists both η^2 , a correlation measure indicating the independent relationship of a predictor variable and income, and β , the regression coefficient, which gives the contribution of each independent variable adjusted for all other independent variables simultaneously. Because the number of cases is large, almost all values shown are statistically significant. Also shown are the absolute dollar variations from the overall mean income associated with each category of each adjusted independent variable. After other predictors were adjusted for, gender, work in the industrial sector, period of immigration/nativity (except for whites), age, education, and prestige all retained considerable importance. Weeks worked in 1979, as a covariate, showed consistently high F ratios. We did not analyze its precise effects, but simply controlled for it. The overall model is quite effective in predicting mean income, with a multiple R of about .40, varying with ethnicity.⁵

Even after adjustment, income differentials between the sexes remain very high, especially for Japanese and whites. Among Japanese, for example, the income difference between men and women is about \$7300; the incomes of men exceeding the income of women by 63 percent. The sex differences are smaller for immigrant Asian-American groups, but nevertheless remain impressive. The industrial sector differentiates income levels strongly for most ethnic groups, but for some reason is weak for Filipinos and Koreans. As we expected from previous analyses, recency of immigration retains salience after adjustment for Asian-American groups with a large number of immigrants. It is least important for Japanese because there have been few recent immigrants and because of the character of recent Japanese immigrants. In the case of Vietnamese, the figures are hard to interpret because almost all immigrants had been in the United States for a short time as of 1980. In general, it appears that Asian-American immigrants (except Japanese) receive low incomes during their first five years in the United States but later approach

equity. Again, we must caution that these arguments are based on cross-sectional data. Finally, note that all Asian-American natives receive less income than do immigrants who have been here a long time. Education remains a strong predictor of income. Only college graduates and postgraduates show any significant gains over the average because of the skewed distribution of income. White graduates, in particular, have a substantial income advantage over Asian Americans. Prestige, too, retains strong predictive power, about the same as gender.

After we account for other variables, it is clear that new immigrants (1975–80) suffer a large income loss for reasons not explained by this model. Although prestige, time worked, and educational levels are somewhat lower for new immigrants, these characteristics account for only part of the initially observed differences in income.

Curious about this phenomenon, we constructed another MCA to predict occupational prestige (Table 7) and found that the predictor variables are the same, except for occupational prestige. When one compares the results of Tables 6 and 7, it is clear that gender, sector, age, and immigration/nativity have very small (though mostly statistically significant) effects on prestige. Education has a very powerful effect, as we would expect. These findings may be contrasted with those for income, for which education, gender, sector, immigration/nativity, age, and weeks worked all have strong adjusted effects. Accordingly, we suggest that the occupations held by Asian Americans are determined largely by their educational levels, not by the many other factors that we know shape income.

However, for given levels of occupational prestige, income varies considerably. For example, women are paid less than are men in similar occupations, perhaps, in part, because of such factors as pregnancy, but most of the difference remains unexplained, (see Appendix). We also know that the periphery pays less than does the core (which provided Bonacich and Cheng (1984) with a theory of exploitation and international migration). In the case of new Asian-American immigrants, lower incomes are due, in part, to the fewer weeks they worked in a year, concentrations in the periphery, lower ages, less work experience, less education, and being in lower prestige occupations. Still, the very large difference in income by period of immigration cannot be explained by these vari-

⁵ We do not discuss interactions here because first- and second-order interactions were very small, and nearly all were statistically insignificant. Those that were significant varied by ethnicity, making coherent discussion, much less modification of the overall model, unproductive.

Table 7. Multiple Classification Analysis of Determinants of Occupational Prestige (Temme Score)

Variable/Statistic	Japanese	Chinese	Filipino	Korean	Asian Indian	Vietnamese	Whites
<i>Weeks Worked, 1979 (covariate)</i>							
F ratio	480.4	951.2	801.3	422.6	1055.2	118.1	89.6
Grand mean prestige score	43.5	45.1	42.4	41.1	52.1	37.6	42.3
<i>Sex</i>							
F ratio	7.8	115.7	0.1*	169.9	15.6	3.8*	1.8*
Eta (unadjusted)	.16	.16	.01	.31	.23	.12	.05
Beta (adjusted)	.02	.06	.00	.14	.04	.03	.02
Deviation in prestige (adjusted)							
Male	0.29	1.0	0	2.6	0.6	0.4	-0.3
Female	-0.28	-1.1	0	-2.2	-0.9	-0.5	0.3
<i>Industrial Sector</i>							
F ratio	409.5	397.3	145.9	0.0*	9.5	17.8	18.7
Eta (unadjusted)	.18	.28	.11	.05	.08	.10	.04
Beta (adjusted)	.13	.12	.08	.00	.03	.06	.06
Deviation in prestige (adjusted)							
Periphery	-1.71	-1.5	-1.2	0	0.5	-0.9	-0.8
Core	2.24	2.6	1.4	0	-0.6	0.9	0.8
<i>Year of Immigration/Nativity</i>							
F ratio	55.3	39.1	110.2	69.5	7.4	5.4	0.8*
Eta (unadjusted)	.19	.17	.19	.24	.24	.13	.05
Beta (adjusted)	.10	.08	.14	.17	.05	.07	.02
Deviation in Prestige (adjusted)							
1975-80	0.9	-1.9	-3.7	-2.8	-1.0	-0.3	-0.2
1970-74	-2.4	-0.6	-0.4	0.2	0.5	1.1	-2.2
1960-69	-3.1	0.1	2.0	4.2	1.3	3.8	-2.3
Before 1960	-3.1	2.1	2.7	5.0	0.3	-3.2	-0.3
Native	0.7	1.0	1.8	4.2	-1.2	4.0	0.1
<i>Age</i>							
F ratio	39.2	18.1	14.6	0.7*	6.5	4.0	14.0
Eta (unadjusted)	.21	.19	.18	.11	.14	.08	.08
Beta (adjusted)	.07	.04	.04	.01	.04	.05	.09
Deviation in prestige (Adjusted)							
25-34	-1.1	-0.3	0	0	-0.7	-0.6	-1.7
35-44	1.4	1.2	0.8	0	0.9	1.0	1.0
45-54	0.9	-0.5	-0.6	0	-0.3	0.2	1.0
55-64	-0.8	-0.6	-1.7	-1	1.0	0.8	0.4
<i>Education Completed</i>							
F ratio	2024.3	2767.4	2240.1	612.8	1028.3	350.9	591.3
ETA (unadjusted)	.55	.61	.56	.54	.57	.50	.55
Beta (adjusted)	.53	.56	.55	.45	.52	.47	.56
Deviation in prestige (adjusted)							
Less than high school	-10.8	-12.1	-13.5	-9.2	-17.3	-6.5	-9.1
Completed high school	-6.3	-7.2	-8.5	-6.4	-12.0	-3.2	-3.1
Some college	-4	-1.7	-2.7	0	-7.4	2.7	2.3
Completed college or more	11.2	10.3	9.4	9.2	7.3	14.3	14.3
Number	17,749	18,895	16,645	7,206	8,844	3,833	4,089
Multiple R	.585	.643	.590	.585	.599	.516	.565
Multiple R ²	.343	.413	.349	.342	.359	.266	.320

* Statistically insignificant at the .01 level.

ables. We would like to suggest here that new immigrants are also paid less for equivalent occupations, as is the case with women.⁶

⁶ Informants have told us that many firms in Silicone Valley make it a practice of hiring immigrant engineers on engineers in Asia at low salaries. Until recently, many interns and physi-

CONCLUSION

Our results do not allow unequivocal tests of the hypotheses suggested by the assimilation, human capital and structural theories

cians in inner cities and in rural communities were Asian immigrants. Other examples abound.

discussed previously. However, they tend to support the structuralist arguments for the following reasons:

1. The *assimilation* hypothesis is generally not supported because native Asian Americans have not attained income equity with whites. In the case of more recent immigrants, there seems to be some evidence that a longer stay in the United States increases income, but it does not produce consistent equity when other variables are controlled.

2. The *human capital* hypothesis is rejected because the higher levels of education of Asian Americans are not translated into income parity with whites when other variables are accounted for.

3. The *structuralist* hypothesis is tentatively accepted because neither the length of residence nor the educational levels of Asian Americans produces income equity with whites when other factors are accounted for. The results of this investigation show that although the higher levels of education of Asian Americans result in higher occupational prestige scores, there is a slippage between these higher prestige scores and income, especially in the case of recent immigrants. We attribute this slippage to discrimination against new immigrants, which is consistent with the structuralist position.

The observation of the discrepancy between prestige and incomes is all somewhat complicated by the fact that Asian Americans do not form a coherent category. Rather, there appear to be at least four different types with different characteristics. First, Japanese are most similar to whites in socioeconomic characteristics; they have a long history of immigration but few recent immigrants. Second, Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, and Asian Indians have a very large number of recent immigrants; members of these groups vary considerably in socioeconomic characteristics, depending on the period of immigration. Third, Vietnamese resemble blacks and Hispanics, with low educational levels and incomes. Fourth, native Asian Americans differ from both whites and recent immigrants.

Education appears to be a useful channel to occupational prestige and (more equivocally) to higher incomes for most Asian Americans, unlike the situation of resident underprivileged minorities, such as blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians. This observation does not apply to Vietnamese in 1980, for their

situation appears worse than that of blacks or Hispanics. However, only Japanese seem to have reached essential equity with whites, and even that point can be disputed for particular data sets.

The remaining disparities between Asian Americans and whites appear to be accounted for, in part, by the very large number of recent immigrants among Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, and Asian Indians and, ironically, by differences between whites and native Asian Americans. It is clear that recent immigrants are underpaid in their various occupational settings in much the same fashion as are women. This conclusion is based on data as of 1980, and, of course, the "deindustrialization" of the American economy that began just before the 1980 census may have made it more difficult for recent immigrants to achieve the economic success enjoyed by their immediate predecessors. Certainly, the data we examined indicate that Asian immigrants who have resided in the United States for a decade or two are enjoying excellent income returns on their education, competing handily with whites. These advantages are due, in large part, to their being professionals, especially those who are self-employed.

The data we presented here show that overall, Asian Americans are better educated than are whites. In the case of Japanese, it is difficult to find much evidence of income discrimination compared to whites. Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, and Asian Indians all show smaller income advantages compared to their high levels of education, but, as we reported, this finding appears to be due mostly to the large proportion of recent immigrants in these ethnic categories. We think it is important that the disadvantages experienced by immigrants are similar to those experienced by women: They both appear to be paid less for equivalent occupations. It is true, of course, that some new immigrants enter the labor force in occupations that are beneath their educational capabilities, some tend to be drawn into the periphery, suffer the consequences of less time worked or less experience because they are young. However, many appear to find occupations that are commensurate with their education but are paid less than are dominant Americans or older immigrants for those positions. In this sense, they are similar to

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their early twentieth-century forbears, but it is hoped, for a shorter period of their lives.

It is obvious that Asian-American women receive a much smaller income return on their education than do Asian-American men—a situation they share with white women. Sex discrimination, in fact, appears to be equal to or greater than the discrimination experienced by new immigrants. This finding cannot be explained by education, weeks worked, occupational prestige, or recency of immigration.

Some of these findings do not disagree completely with the general expectations of assimilation theory, but neither do they suggest that Asian Americans have been assimilated, either structurally or politically. The census data tell nothing about the elite strata of American society, which apparently remains an exclusive network of dominant Americans. We feel more comfortable with the formulations of Kim and Hurh (1983) and of Ogbu (1978), who suggested that minorities may be forming separate "adaptive" communities. Asian Americans may have higher educational and income levels than do blacks, Hispanics, or American Indians, but it does not follow that they are more "assimilated." One may recall that Jews relearned this lesson most bitterly earlier in this century.

At the same time, in partial deference to human capital theory, it is true that Asian Americans (except Vietnamese) are better educated and have higher incomes than do blacks or Hispanics. The weakness of human capital theory appears to be that it makes too simplistic assumptions about the relationship of education to income, which needs to be articulated by the intervention of occupation (or occupational prestige).

Although our results seem to give some support for the structural theories of Bonacich and Cheng (1984), Lieberman (1980), or Steinberg (1981), those theories rest on historical analyses of previous generations of immigrants. As we pointed out earlier, many recent immigrants to the United States were already well educated and embedded in a capitalist international economic system before they immigrated, unlike the earlier Asian (and other) immigrants to the United States. Even so, very recent Asian immigrants show income losses that cannot be explained by ordinary predictors of income. Furthermore, by no means do all Asian immigrants fit these generalizations: Many continue to enter the

United States without high educational or occupational skills, and their situations will bear close examination over the next decade. Vietnamese, in particular, should make an ideal test case for the proponents of structuralist and human capital theories.

Despite the weaknesses of human capital theory, it would nevertheless be foolhardy to disregard the general importance of education and occupation in determining income in contemporary American society. Many Asian Americans appear to have learned how to reap their combined rewards, despite other obstacles. However, an accurate assessment of their "success" requires that we also consider such factors as national origin, recency of arrival (for immigrants), nativity, gender, actual occupations obtained, and employment in the industrial sector. The failure to do so leads to overly simplistic stereotypes and unfortunate social policies.

APPENDIX

Although sex differences were not the principal focus of this article, we were asked about the effects of other variables on them. In response, we entered the variables "hours worked in 1979" and "marital status" (married or unmarried) into two additional MCA runs for Chinese and Japanese, respectively. With number of hours worked, weeks worked and age entered as covariates, R^2 for Japanese was .430, compared to the original value of .423. For Chinese, the revised R^2 was .441, compared to the original .435. The added variables changed the beta for sex from .32 to .30 (for Japanese) and from .19 to .17 (for Chinese). The beta values for marital status itself were .12 for Japanese and .08 for Chinese. Both hours worked and marital status were statistically significant contributors to the equation, but neither changed the effects of sex appreciably, nor did they have much effect on the R^2 . They had no effect on the variable "year of immigration." We conclude, therefore, that gender differences in income cannot be explained away by traditional predictors of income. The same is true of period of immigration. In the case of both recent Asian immigrants and of women, factors unmeasured in this study had adverse effects on income.

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